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Abstract
If autonomous vehicles are to be widely accepted, we need to ensure their safe operation. For this reason, verification
and validation (V&V) approaches must be developed that are suitable for this domain. Model checking is a formal
technique which allows us to exhaustively explore the paths of an abstract model of a system. Using a probabilistic
model checker such as PRISM, we may determine properties such as the expected time for a mission, or the probability
that a specific mission failure occurs. However, model checking of complex systems is difficult due to the loss of
information during abstraction. This is especially so when considering systems such as autonomous vehicles which
are subject to external influences. An alternative solution is the use of Monte Carlo simulation to explore the results of
a continuous-time model of the system. The main disadvantage of this approach is that the approach is not exhaustive
as not all executions of the system are analysed. We are therefore interested in developing a framework for formal
verification of autonomous vehicles, using Monte Carlo simulation to inform and validate our symbolic models during
the initial stages of development. In this paper, we present a continuous-time model of a quadrotor unmanned aircraft
undertaking an autonomous mission. We employ this model in Monte Carlo simulation to obtain specific mission
properties which will inform the symbolic models employed in formal verification.
Keywords: control, autonomy, unmanned vehicles, Monte Carlo simulation, quantitative formal verification
1. Introduction
The last few years have seen a huge expansion in the applications and capability of unmanned vehicles. In the
military sector, where unmanned vehicles have been in use for decades, efforts are now focussed on increasing the
autonomy of such vehicles. That is, increasing their ability to perform tasks with minimal human interference. The
commercial sector and hobbyist community are further behind in their development of semi- and fully-autonomous
systems. However, autonomous capabilities are just as useful in commercial and civilian applications.
Regardless of the application and their level of autonomy, unmanned vehicles suffer from a number of obstacles
which prevent wide scale use. Unmanned aircraft in particular face certification issues related to the dangers posed by
a lack of human decision-making in the loop [1]. Vehicles operating in any uncontrolled environment face a number
of unpredictable events and random disturbances, whether internal or sourced from the environment. The ability to
appropriately respond to such events and manage such disturbances is a crucial part of any vehicle control system. In
the push towards autonomy, this control system must remove the human element from the loop entirely.
Verification is the process of ensuring that a system such as an autonomous vehicle performs as intended. That
is, given a specific mission, the vehicle is able to realise the mission goals while responding to any number of events,
whether internally or externally derived. Many verification methods exist, ranging from the simple and abstract to the
computationally-intensive. Systems such as software packages may be modelled and verified using abstract approaches
such as formal verification. More complex systems such as autonomous vehicles are less trivial to abstract. This is
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due to the constant variation of the vehicle’s behaviour, its control system and any environmental factors with time.
The presence of random elements in the system adds further complexity.
Due to the intractability of abstracting a complex system, simulation is often used for verification. While still a
form of abstraction, continuous- or discrete-time simulation models have the benefit of retaining the dependency of
the system and any disturbances on time. Algorithms such as Monte Carlo simulation may then be used to explore
the variations in the system due to any stochastic properties such as random events or disturbances. However, there is
the danger that, even after countless iterations, the system has not been exhaustively explored [2]. This differs from
formal verification where the analysis is exhaustive, investigating all possible executions of the system, and therefore
can find ‘corner cases’ which can be missed with alternative approaches. This is particularly important for autonomous
vehicles where guarantees on safety are required. In addition, simulation models are time-consuming to build and run.
This is especially so when employed in a Monte Carlo simulation of potentially thousands of iterations.
It is therefore of benefit to re-examine the capabilities of formal verification in ensuring that an autonomous vehicle
matches its specification. More specifically, we may consider the use of model checking as a verification method.
Model checking involves the construction of a mathematical model usually using a formally specified modelling
language that captures the system’s behaviour and, to verify that the requirements, usually specified in a temporal
logic, are satisfied there is a systematic exploration and analysis of the system model. The drawback of using model
checking is the state-space explosion problem, and to perform model checking of complex systems abstraction is
often required. PRISM [3] is a widely used probabilistic model checker which has support for analysing a wide
range of quantitative requirements against a number of different quantitative models. PRISM has been applied to the
quantitative verification in a wide range of application domains, from wireless communication protocols to power
management systems to systems biology.
An autonomous vehicle may be considered a probabilistic system, with the occurrence of random events deter-
mined by some probability. Model checking may then explore the impact of such events on the vehicle mission. That
is, the paths the vehicle may take to reach a specific finite state, or the ultimate outcome of the mission. However, the
symbolic models employed in model checking software are, by their nature, highly abstracted. Some nuances of the
system may be lost in abstraction, where a continuous-time simulation model may be able to retain these nuances due
to its greater fidelity.
With quantitative model checking of autonomous vehicles being relatively unexplored territory, we wish to deter-
mine the differences between the approaches of formal verification and simulation-based verification. To this end, we
employ a simple autonomous system, undergoing a basic mission in a controlled environment. We describe the system
and environment by a continuous-time model. We then investigate the impact of probabilistic events by evaluating the
results of Monte Carlo simulation. It may be noted that more sophisticated simulation techniques are available, for
example, guided M-C simulation for counter-example generation [4, 5, 6]. This method involves attempting to falsify
a temporal property by guiding simulation using robustness metrics. Our goal is different. We do not wish to optimise
the simulation process itself: the ultimate goal is to produce realistic finite state models for probabilistic verification.
The analysis for this continuous time model are discussed in relation to a concurrent work on a framework for
investigate decision-making in autonomous systems, using probabilistic model checking of an abstract model where
quantitative data for abstract actions is derived from small-scale simulation models [3]. More precisely, in this work we
have built a abstract model of the same autonomous system using this framework. Here we demonstrate that the Monte
Carlo simulation results of the detailed continuous-time model for properties, including the expected time mission
completion and the probability of certain mission failures, agree with the bounds obtained using the probabilistic
model checker PRISM for the abstract discrete-time model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature relating to formal verification of autonomous
vehicles. Section 3 describes a case scenario, involving an autonomous quadrotor unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
with a simple search and retrieve mission. Section 4 describes the continuous-time model of the complete system,
including the quadrotor, the environment, the target objects to be retrieved. Section 5 describes the guidance system
of the quadrotor, which comprises a flight control system (FCS) and finite state machine (FSM), the latter of which
provides the vehicle its autonomy. Section 6 presents the results of a single simulation run and those of the Monte
Carlo simulation. Section 7 describes how probabilistic model checking may be applied to a highly-abstracted model
of our autonomous mission and compares the results obtained through Monte Carlo simulation and probabilistic model
checking. Finally, Section 8 presents the conclusions of the research.
2
2. Related Work
A related area of research is that of reachability analysis for the generation of safe plans for automated vehicles [7,
8, 9]. Dynamic models of automated vehicles are used to generate a safe set of reachable states (with respect to
uncertainties in the movement of vehicles in the system), and thence to generate a safe plan of movement. Our goal is
different: we start with a dynamic model of a system (a unmanned aircraft), and use it to (ultimately) derive a faithful
finite state probabilistic representation of our system. We then use model checking to examine probabilistic properties
of the system (by exploring the smaller, finite state model). Not only can we perform reachability analysis using model
checking, but we can analyse our system with respect to a wide range of properties expressed via stochastic logic.
Unmanned vehicles are a complex combination of subsystems in both hardware and software domains. As such,
model checking may be used in a variety of investigations in unmanned vehicle verification. Typically, the control
system of the vehicle is verified such that its effect on the vehicle behaviour meets the desired specification. However,
the purpose of this control system can vary between simple automatic stabilisation and complex decision-making
algorithms with multiple subsystems. Here, we discuss existing work in formal verification of control systems for
vehicles both manned and unmanned.
Examples of the use of model checking for automatic control systems are few. This is likely due to the relative
simplicity of such a system in comparison to an autonomous or semi-autonomous system. Typically, control systems
such as those on aircraft were easily described as simple autopilots. Many more recent flight control systems (FCS)
employ autonomy to some degree and, as such, merit the need for verification. A study by Airbus [10] investigated the
use of model checking for a variety of experiments in verification of embedded systems on A340 and A400M aircraft.
A study by Lerda et al. [2] uses model checking to verify of an embedded control system for a UAV. This investi-
gation uses a continuous-time model, developed in MATLAB, to accurately describe the dynamics of the UAV. Model
checking is then used to verify the control system. The study highlights the benefits of both simulation and model
checking. Simulation can be cumbersome and is often prohibitively time-consuming when exploring the many aspects
of a system’s behaviour. Conversely, model checking of a continuous-time system is difficult, as the state-space of a
continuous system is infinite in size. The use of hybrid automata is one solution to this problem [11, 12, 13], however
the formal verification techniques which are applicable to such a model are computationally expensive. Additionally,
the complexity of systems which can be analysed using this approach is low. This precludes application to autonomous
systems, which are complex by their very nature.
Many instances of model checking for autonomous vehicles involve swarms. Typically, the use of a group of
vehicles to perform some task is investigated. Model checking is then used to identify the routes that may be taken
to accomplish this task. Examples include UAVs in a pursuer-evader [14] and foraging [15, 16, 17] scenarios. Many
of these investigations describe the behaviour of each entity in the swarm as a finite state machine (FSM). In a simple
model, the number of entities and their states determine the size of the model’s state-space. The dynamics of the
vehicles are considered in some cases through the use of simulation [16, 17]. However, in these instances, the vehicles
in question are relatively simple in their mechanics.
Other applications of model checking to autonomous vehicles focus on verifying the interaction between agents in
co-operative missions [18]. More recent work focusses on the verification of autonomous behaviours with a view to
obtaining certification of UAVs for widespread commercial use [1, 19].
3. Scenario
We employ a simple scenario as a case study. A quadrotor UAV is in operation inside a small, constrained environment.
This environment is based on the University of Glasgow’s Micro Air Systems Technologies (MAST) Laboratory, a
4× 7× 3 m cuboidal flight space with an Optitrack1 motion capture system for tracking UAVs. Three inanimate target
objects, each of unique colour and shape, are located somewhere on the floor of the lab. The UAV is programmed such
that it should take off from a specified landing site and following a predetermined series of waypoints, while searching
for these objects. Upon finding a target, the quadrotor retrieves it from the floor, transports it to a predetermined drop
site and deposits it. It then continues following the waypoints until all of the targets have been relocated or it reaches
1Natural Point, Inc. https://www.optitrack.com
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the final waypoint. It then returns to base, having either succeeded in its mission by relocating all targets or failed by
having missed at least one.
Stochastic behaviour is introduced into the scenario through the inclusion of faults, the occurrence of which are
based on a uniform probability distribution. Certain system properties are defined similarly, such as the initial locations
of the targets, the landing site of the quadrotor and the drop site. These are described in greater detail in Section 4.8.
These random properties can propagate through the model, ultimately affecting the outcome of the mission. The
success of the mission is thus a function of the target, drop site and landing site locations and the occurrence of
faults. This function is then defined by the model of the autonomous system. This model is a complex combination of
hardware and software subsystems.
4. Mathematical Model
The mathematical model describes a multi-agent system and is implemented using an object-oriented programming
(OOP) approach. The quadrotor may be considered as either an active or cognitive agent [20]. The targets can be
considered as passive agents [20], in that they have their own dynamics but no goals or reactive behaviours. They
may alternatively be considered objects [21], in that they may be modified by the UAV agent. We choose the former
definition for the targets, such that we may denote a generic agent A and use it to specify properties or behaviours
common to both UAV and targets. All agents exist with an environment, which corresponds to the MAST Laboratory
in this instance.
The UAV agent has more complex behaviours than the targets. Its guidance software contains both a flight control
system and decision-making algorithms. It is these decision-making algorithms which allow the UAV to perform its
mission with no interference from a human operator.
In this section, we describe the mathematical model of the multi-agent system, comprising the UAV, targets and
environment. First, we define the overall structure of the model. That is, how the agents interact with one another
and the environment. Then, we define the frames of reference used to describe the behaviours of the agents in a
local body-fixed axes system. We then provide the framework for the geometrical models of the simulation, including
the environment. Models of the quadrotor hardware are defined, including the vehicle dynamics and sensor systems.
Target dynamics are described similarly. Finally, the stochastic variables used to introduce probabilities into the model
are detailed.
4.1. Structure
Figure 1 shows a simplified diagram of the multi-agent system. The UAV’s sensor suite senses both the internal
states of the quadrotor and the geometry of the targets and environment. The sensor measurements are utilised by the
guidance system of the UAV, which then provides control inputs to the UAV’s rotors. The guidance system comprises
several subsystems which allow the UAV to interpret the sensor feedback, decide on a course of action and drive the
vehicle towards that action. This is described in greater detail in Section 5. When the UAV grasps a target, the target
behaviour then becomes dependent on the response of the UAV. The dynamics of the UAV hence directly impact the
target response during grasping. The environment is static and hence unaffected by the behaviour of the agents.
4.2. Frames of Reference
The positions and orientations of agents are described in an inertially-fixed World frame of reference, denotedW.
This frame is defined such that zW is in the direction of the local gravity vector, while xW and yW are parallel to the
boundaries of the environment and satisfy the rule xˆ = yˆ× zˆ. The position of an agent A is described inW by rA ∈ R3,
where it is assumed that the agent body is rigid.
We can define a second frame of referenceA, which is fixed on any agent A and has origin at rA, which corresponds
to the agent centre of mass. The transformation fromW toA is described by the direction cosine matrix
RAW =
 cos θ cosψ cos θ sinψ − sin θsin φ sin θ cosψ − cos φ sinψ sin φsθ sinψ + cos φ cosψ sin φ cos θcos φ sin θ cosψ + sin φ sinψ cos φ sin θ sinψ − sin φ cosψ cos φ cos θ
 (1)
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Figure 1: Block diagram of multi-agent system.
Thus, any position qA in A may be described in W by evaluating the relationship qW = RWA qA. The reverse
transformation qA = RAWq
W, where RWA = (R
A
W)
T similarly applies.
The orientation is alternatively described by the vector ηA = [φ, θ, ψ]
T . The rotation of A is described by the
angular velocity vector ωA ∈ R3. The rate of change of orientation η˙A with respect to W is then described by the
relationship
η˙A = J
−1
A ωA
where J−1A =
1 sin φ tan θ cos φ tan θ0 cos φ − sin φ0 sin φ sec θ cos φ sec θ
 (2)
We can then state that any rigid body agent A inW has position rA(t) ∈ R3 and orientation (or attitude) ηA(t) ∈ R3.
The position and attitude responses of a given agent are determined by the dynamics of that agent.
4.3. Geometry
The geometry of the model is defined as a series of polygons with associated faces, vertices and colours. In general,
any geometrical object is composed of a series of faces. Each face has an associated colour. The shape, position and
orientation of a face in a given reference frame is determined by the number and positions of the vertices associated
with that face. The primary use of the geometrical models is to visualise the simulation through animation. However,
the models are also used by the UAV’s camera sensor model to sense the environment and target agents.
The geometry of any agent A is composed of m vertices, where each vertex i ∈ {1, 2, . . .m}, with position vi ∈ R3,
is associated with one or more faces. If the geometry has n faces, a single face j ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} of p vertices is then
defined by the vector f j. Each face j has an associated colour, defined by the vector C j ∈ [0, 1]3.
Colour detection is used to identify targets. If we state that each colour C j corresponds to a specific face j, we may
obtain the indices i of the vertices associated with that face and colour from the elements of f j. We may then ignore
vertices associated with colours outside of a chosen range. The visibility of remaining vertices to the camera sensor is
evaluated by considering their positions vi in camera image space. This is described in greater detail in Section 5.3.5.
The position vAi of any agent vertex vi is fixed in the local frame of reference A. It may be described in W by
considering the transformation
vWi = R
W
A v
A
i + rA (3)
where rA is the position of the origin ofA inW.
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Figure 2: Quadrotor body-fixed frame definition and rotor arrangement.
4.4. Environment
The environment is defined as a simple arena which imposes limits on the freedom of the agents. The World frame
W is defined as beng at the geometric centre of the floor of the environment. The zW-axis is defined in the direction of
the local gravity vector. The position of any object or vertex inW can be described by r = [x, y, z]T . The environment
then imposes the limits x ∈ [−2, 2], y ∈ [−3.5, 3.5], z ∈ [−3, 0].
The geometry of the environment is limited to defining the location of the drop site rds, where the collected targets
are deposited. We may define the drop zone as the interior of a circle centred at rds with radius Rds. The UAV perceives
targets inside the drop zone, but otherwise ignores them.
4.5. Quadrotor Dynamics
A quadrotor is used as the UAV platform, owing to its versatility and mechanical simplicity. A quadrotor typically
consists of four fixed-pitch rotors spaced equally around the centre of mass of the vehicle airframe. The rotors produce
both lifting force and, by creating thrust differentials between opposing pairs of rotors, enable control over vehicle
attitude. The behaviour of the quadrotor is detailed in [22, 23, 24].
For the search and retrieve scenario, we employ a standard quadrotor UAV with some additional components. The
quadrotor is considered a rigid body, with the primary force and moment contribution from the four rotors and the
vehicle weight. To facilitate its interaction with any target, we describe the dynamics of a rigidly-mounted grasping
arm separately. We then introduce a simple gimbal-stabilised platform for the UAV’s camera sensor, and a simple
power consumption model.
4.5.1. Rigid-Body Dynamics
We define a quadrotor body-fixed frameQwhich has origin at the vehicle centre of mass, xQ in the nominal forward
direction, yQ in the nominal starboard direction and zQ such that the condition zˆ = xˆ × yˆ is satisfied. The position of
the vehicle inW is denoted rQ and its attitude by ηQ.
Next, we employ a standard quadrotor dynamic model, which assumes a rigid-body response with six degrees
of freedom [23, 25]. The rotor dynamics are assumed to be sufficiently faster than the closed-loop body dynamics
[23], such that they may be considered instantaneous. A linear relationship between thrust and input PWM signal is
assumed [24]. The rotor arrangement shown in Figure 2 is employed.
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We make the addition of a simple mass-spring-damper model to represent the vehicle interaction with the floor of
the environment. Any collision with the floor is thus described as a highly-damped spring. This “floor force” applies
only when the floor plane intersects the rigid geometry of the UAV. The geometry of the UAV is thus characterised by
an effective radius RQ around the centre of mass. When the floor plane intersects with this sphere of radius RQ about
rQ = [x, y, z]T , a force is exerted. Otherwise, no force is exerted.
This force, denoted F f , is assumed to produce no moment and act normal to the floor plane only, that is in the zW
direction. We thus describe it by the conditional relationship
F f = F fRQW zˆ
where F f =
−kQ(RQ + zQ) − cQz˙ if zQ ≥ −RQ0 if zQ < −RQ (4)
where kQ is the spring stiffness and cQ the damping coefficient. These parameters determine the “spring” of the floor.
That is, how much the UAV bounces upon collision with the floor.
The quadrotor dynamics are thus described by the 12-state non-linear model
r¨Q =
(
g +
F f
mQ
)
zˆ − KT
mQ
4∑
k=1
uk RWQ zˆ
η˙Q = J
−1
Q ωQ
ω˙Q = I−1Q

 LKT (u2 − u1)LKT (u3 − u4)KQ(−u1 − u2 + u3 + u4)
 − ωQ × IQωQ

(5)
where mQ is the quadrotor mass and I its inertia tensor, g is the acceleration due to gravity, KT and KQ are rotor gains,
L is the rotor moment arm and F f is subject to the conditions imposed by Equation (4). The properties of the quadrotor
model are detailed in Table 3. These are obtained from system identification of the Quanser Qball-X4 quadrotor, as
described in [24].
4.5.2. Grasper Arm Dynamics
When a target is tethered to the quadrotor, its dynamics are coupled to those of the grasper arm. The dynamics of
the arm are thus considered separately from the UAV’s rigid-body response. The grasper has fixed position rQG/Q ∈ R3
in the rotating frame Q. It therefore has the inertial position
rG = rQ + RWQ r
Q
G/Q
with the second derivative
r¨G = r¨Q + RWQ
[
ωQ ×
(
ωQ × rQG/Q
)
+ ω˙Q × rQG/Q
]
(6)
where translational and rotational accelerations, r¨Q and ω˙Q respectively, are given by Equation (5). The rotational
dynamics of the grasper are identical to that of the quadrotor.
4.5.3. Gimbal Dynamics
The camera sensor is mounted on a gimbal which stabilises it during rolling and pitching motion. When the UAV
is level, the principal axis of the camera is in the direction of zW. We define xC in this direction, while yC and zC are
in the directions of the camera image’s horizontal and vertical directions, respectively.
When the UAV rolls or pitches the gimbal platform rotates to counter this displacement. The roll φg and pitch θg
dynamics of the gimbal platform may be described by the first-order system[
φ˙g
θ˙g
]
= − 1
τg
[
φ + φg
θ + θg
]
(7)
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where τg is the time constant of the gimbal rotational response.
It is assumed that the camera centre is coincident with both the centre of rotation of the gimbal platform and the
origin of C. The relationship between C and Q is then described by the direction cosine matrix
RCQ =
 sin θg 0 cos θg0 1 0− cos θg 0 sin θg

1 0 00 cos φg sin φg0 − sin φg cos φg

=
 sin θg − sin φg cos θg cos φg cos θg0 cos φg sin φg− cos θg − sin φg sin θg cos φg sin θg

RQC =
(
RCQ
)T
(8)
4.5.4. Battery Model
A battery model is employed to allow us to introduce the complication of the UAV periodically returning to base
to recharge. As the battery discharges, the voltage supplied to the UAV reduces. This reduction is described by the
first-order model
V˙ =

vc if charging and V < Vmax
vd if not charging
0 if V ≥ Vmax
(9)
where vc > 0 is the charging rate, which applies when the UAV is idle at the landing site, vd < 0 is the discharge rate,
which applies when the UAV is pursuing its mission. The voltage level has the upper limit V ≤ Vmax, above which it
will not charge. The discharge rate is approximated as a constant. In reality, the battery drain is affected by the power
requirements of the rotors and other hardware components.
4.5.5. Stochastic Properties of the Quadrotor
We have previously described a simple deterministic quadrotor model. The model has enough detail that it may
realistically describe a quadrotor which is capable of sitting idle on the ground, flying and grasping objects. In reality,
the quadrotor is subject to a number of stochastic events. Through their effect on the system behaviour, these events
can impact the particulars of the mission, including its outcome. Here, we discuss some of these events and, if relevant,
how we have chosen to incorporate these into our model.
First, we may consider the effect of external disturbances. Such disturbances are products of the local environment
and are governed by a system far greater in complexity than the quadrotor itself. Thus, we may consider them to be
random. These disturbances may manifest as forces or moments acting on the vehicle body. They may also impact
the performance of the rotors by changing the local airflow around the rotor disk. A robust control system is typically
employed to reduce the impact of such disturbances. In reality, even with robust control, these disturbances may have
the effect of changing the path the UAV takes, or the time it takes to perform a manoeuvre.
The quadrotor system may also be subject to internal disturbances. These may manifest as a change in a parameter
which is expected to be constant. For example, it is assumed that the rotor thrust gain KT does not change. However,
the thrust gain can be altered by a number of phenomena, including varying battery level and local airflow around the
rotor, as indicated above. One or more rotors may also fail entirely, due to a fault in any of the components between
autopilot and rotor, such as the motor or propeller. Regardless of where the fault occurs, the effect is a complete loss
of thrust and torque from that rotor.
The occurrence such an actuator fault is based on a large number of variables. We abstract the probability of such a
fault occurring by using a geometric distribution assuming that, with the fixed period Ta, the probability of an actuator
fault equals Pa : R≥0 → [0, 1] (see Table 3). We model the actuator fault as a complete loss of thrust in a single rotor,
that is KTk = 0 for a random rotor k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. For example, if a fault occurs in the rear rotor k = 1, the maximum
propulsive force is reduced by a quarter and the u1 terms in Equation (5) may be neglected.
While control strategies are available to deal with an actuator fault [26], the reduced capability of the vehicle
typically results in a controlled emergency landing, if not a crash landing. In Section 5.3, we introduce a control
algorithm specifically for emergency landings after actuator loss.
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A fault in the UAV’s grasping mechanism may result in the mechanism becoming stuck in its current state or it
may release any tethered objects. Since the former may result in a target being permanently tethered to the UAV and
thus preventing mission success, we limit our model to include the later case only. It is assumed that some fault occurs
which causes the grasper mechanism to deactivate. This has no effect when no target is being grasped. However, if a
target is held by the mechanism, it is released and the UAV must retrieve it again to continue the mission. Just as we
define the probability of an actuator fault occurring, we may assume that the probability of a grasper fault occurring
within a fixed time period Tg equals Pg : R≥0 → [0, 1]. The impact on the UAV behaviour due to a grasper fault is
detailed in Section 5.1.
Finally, we randomly define the pose (position and heading) of the UAV at the beginning of the mission. This has
the effect of altering the behaviour of the UAV as the predicates which trigger transitions from mode to another may
occur at different times and under different circumstances. That the target locations and drop site are also randomly
defined further contributes to the uncertainty in the system.
4.6. Quadrotor Sensors
The quadrotor employs a standard sensor suite to measure system states and sense the environment. A motion
capture system allows direct measurement of vehicle position and attitude. An inertial measurement unit (IMU),
containing tri-axial accelerometers and gyroscopes, measures accelerations and angular rates in Q. A camera sensor
mounted on the underside of the vehicle is used to visually sense the geometry of the environment and targets. This
section describes the models of the sensor behaviour. Interpretation and exploitation of sensor outputs is described in
Section 5.
4.6.1. Motion Capture System
The position and attitude of the UAV inW are measured by the motion capture system. The model is based on the
MAST Laboratory’s Optitrack system . Neglecting measurement noise, we may assume the motion capture system
measures both position and attitude with zero error, giving
oˆr = rQ, oˆη = ηQ (10)
4.6.2. Inertial Measurement Unit
The angular rates of the UAV in Q are measured by the onboard IMU. Again neglecting any noise or bias errors,
we describe the gyroscope measurement by
gˆ = ωQ (11)
4.6.3. Camera Sensor
The camera sensor provides an image of any unobscured object within its field of view. In reality, the camera
captures an image which is then used in an object detection algorithm. Examples of such algorithms range from simple
colour or intensity detection to more complex shape or pattern recognition. The camera model is described in such a
way that it enables the process of colour detection to be emulated. This process is further detailed in Section 5.3.5.
As detailed in Section 4.3, any vertex i of a geometrical model has position vWi in W. The camera operates by
projecting geometry within the its field of view onto an image plane, demonstrated in Figure 3. In order to achieve
this projection, the vertex position must be determined in a frame C, fixed on the camera body.
The camera has fixed position rQC/Q and orientation R
Q
C in Q. Any vertex vW inW thus has position, relative to the
origin of C, of
vC = RCQ
[
RQW (v − rQ) + rQC/Q
]
(12)
The vertex is now defined relative to the camera and centre. If vC = [vx, vy, vz]T , then the projection of vC onto the
image plane is described by the coordinates
xc = f
vy
vx
, yc = − f vzvx (13)
where f is the focal length of the camera.
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Figure 3: Geometry of a pinhole camera. The coordinates of a point with position r in Euclidean 3-space are mapped
to 2-space be considering the interaction of the point with the image plane [27].
Figure 4: Target geometries and colours as rendered by simulation visualisation.
The camera has horizontal field of view λ and aspect ratio A. For any given vertex c = [xc, yc]T to be visible to the
camera sensor, it must be within the field of view. The conditions
− f tan λ ≤ xc ≤ f tan λ
− f
A
tan λ ≤ yc ≤ fA tan λ
(14)
must therefore be satisfied.
4.7. Target Model
While static for the majority of the mission, each target is given dynamic behaviours in order to facilitate its
interaction with the UAV. In isolation, the behaviour of a target is purely deterministic. However, any interactions with
the UAV are subject to the influence of stochastic and probabilistic behaviours.
While each target has the same dynamic behaviour, we consider three distinct shapes and colours. This allows the
UAV to discriminate between targets based on their colour and, in the event of more complex object detection being
required, their shape. The targets may be seen in Figure 4. We model the three targets as a blue pyramid, red sphere
and green cuboid, respectively.
4.7.1. Rigid-Body Dynamics
We may consider each target to be a rigid body of mass mT. A target body-fixed frame T is defined with origin at
the centre of mass of the target and RWT = I3 before grasping occurs, where I3 is the 3 × 3 identity matrix.
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When tethered to the UAV during grasping, the dynamics of the target are identical to those of the UAV grasping
arm, and are therefore given by
r¨T = r¨G
η˙T = J
−1
T ωT
ω˙T = ω˙Q
(15)
where r¨G and ω˙Q are defined by Equations (6) and (5), respectively.
When not tethered to the UAV, the target dynamics are driven by a simple gravitational force and floor model
r¨T = gzˆ +
1
mT
F f
η˙T = J
−1
T ωT
ω˙T = 0
(16)
where F f is the force exerted by the floor on the target. This now includes a frictional component in the horizontal
plane and is given by
F f =
RTW (−kT (RT + zT) zˆ − cTr˙T) if zT ≥ −RT03×1 if zT < −RT (17)
where RT is the effective radius of the target and kT, cT represent the spring stiffness and damping of the floor-target
interaction. This floor model allows us to describe the behaviour of the target as it impacts the floor and comes to rest.
4.7.2. Stochastic Properties of the Target
The internal behaviour of the target as described by Equation (16) is purely deterministic. However, when grasped
by the UAV, its behaviour is determined by that of the UAV (Equation (15)). In this state, any stochastic behaviours
demonstrated by the UAV will similarly impact the target.
The actuator fault described previously has the effect of prematurely ending the mission, thus its effect on the target
is largely inconsequential. Conversely, a fault in the grasping mechanism has significant impact on both the UAV and
target.
When a fault occurs in the UAV’s grasping mechanism, any target currently tethered to the UAV is released. The
target then follows a ballistic trajectory before colliding with the ground. In this phase, the state transition of the target
is purely deterministic (Equation 16), although the state vector at the beginning of the trajectory is determined by the
state of the UAV at release, which is stochastic. The eventual resting place of the target after being dropped is thus
similarly random.
Similarly, the initial pose of each target is randomly defined. This impacts the behaviour of the UAV and thus the
time and location at which the target is picked up by the UAV and deposited in the drop zone.
4.8. Summary of Modelled Stochastic Properties
As detailed previously, both the UAV and target agents are subject to non-deterministic behaviours. These may be
caused by randomly-define properties or by events which have a certain probability of occurring.
4.8.1. Random Properties
As described in the models for each agent type, the initial positions of the UAV and targets on the xW-yW plane
are defined at random. The headings ψ are similarly specified. If an agent A has position rA,0 = [x0, y0, z0]T at
time t = 0, then the position in the horizontal plane is defined randomly in the ranges x0 ∈ [−1.9, 1.9] and y0 ∈
[−3.4, 3.4]. The initial height is defined z0 = −RA, where RA is the effective radius of the agent. The drop site location
rds = [xds, yds, zds]T is similarly defined, with xds ∈ [−1.5, 1.5], yds ∈ [−3, 3] and zds = 0. The random properties are
generated using a uniform distribution.
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4.8.2. Probabilistic Events
We have described the effects of actuator and grasper mechanism faults on the UAV system. We may implement
these faults in our simulation by evaluating the probability of their occurrence in a given time step dt.
An actuator fault may occur at any time. If the UAV is airborne, an actuator fault forces the UAV to perform an
emergency landing, thus failing the mission. The probability of an actuator fault occurring in some period of time Ta
is denoted Pa. The probability of it occurring during any given time step is then defined by
Pa,dt = 1 − (1 − Pa) dtTa
A fault in the grasping mechanism may also occur at any time. However, it only affects the mission when a target
is tethered to the UAV. Upon this fault occurring, the target is dropped. The probability of a grasping mechanism fault
occurring in some period of time Tg is denoted Pg. The probability of it occurring during any given time step is then
Pg,dt = 1 − (1 − Pg)
dt
Tg
Finally, we may define a generic system fault. This represents the detection of some undesirable condition after
the UAV has taken off. Examples of such conditions include interrupted communications between UAV and ground
control station, erratic sensor feedback or the absence of some required system parameters or commands. The UAV’s
decision-making system has an Initialise mode specifically for detecting these conditions. The probability that some
undesirable condition is detected during this mode is given by Ps : R≥0 → [0, 1] and is independent of time.
5. Autonomous Guidance System
The guidance system of the UAV consists of a number of autonomous modes which dictate the behaviour of the
UAV at any given time. Each mode comprises a combination of automatic control and trajectory modules, which
collaborate to drive the UAV towards a specific position and heading. The modes and the transitions between them
may be represented as a finite state machine, shown in Figure 5. The UAV can respond to any internal or external event
considered in the simulation. In a real-world scenario, events may occur which are unmodelled in the simulation. In
implementing this guidance system in reality, this would make the UAV only semi-autonomous. Human intervention
would likely be required to mitigate the effects of some events which the guidance system is not designed to react to.
Using the FSM to represent the behaviour of the guidance system, each mode corresponds to a state of the FSM.
Only one mode may thus be active at any given time. The guidance system progresses from one mode to another under
certain conditions. The criteria which dictate an exit from the current mode and which mode succeeds the current one
are known as predicates. The predicates for each mode are shown with reference to the FSM in Figure 5.
We now detail the behaviour of each mode with reference to the control and trajectory modules or commands
employed in each case. The algorithms of each of these modules are then described.
5.1. Guidance Modes
The guidance modes determine which control and trajectory modules are active at any given time, and what the
inputs to each of these modules are. Each mode thus comprises a unique set of instructions and modules. These are
summarised in Table 1.
The UAV begins the mission in Idle. It then progresses to Take-off and subsequently Initialise, where a self-
diagnosis is performed. The probability of continuing the mission (as opposed to landing) is determined by the system
fault probability Ps. The UAV may then either progress to Search or Land mode, whereupon it continues as per the
predicates of each state. The modes, transitions and predicates are detailed in Figure 5. Each mode may be summarised
as follows.
5.1.1. Idle
The UAV sits at rest with its rotors inactive. The UAV begins the mission in this mode, resting at the landing site.
It returns to this mode after completing the mission, with one of two landing modes leading to Idle. When succeeding
Land, the UAV rests at the landing site. When succeeding Emergency land, its location is wherever it comes to rest
after colliding with the floor.
The UAV exists this mode only when V = Vmax. This ensures that the battery is fully charged before beginning or
resuming the mission. It may then progress to Take-off if the mission has not yet been completed.
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Figure 5: Finite-state machine describing AI logic.
Table 1: Guidance commands and modules for each AI mode.
Mode Input Command / Module Trajectory Command / Module
Idle uQ = [0, 0, 0, 0]T –
Take-off State feedback controller rd = [x0, y0, zhvr]T
Initialise State feedback controller rd = [x0, y0, zhvr]T
Search State feedback controller Search pattern
Identify State feedback controller rd = rentry
Hover above target State feedback, visual controllers Object tracking, zd = zsrch
Descend to grasp State feedback, visual controllers Object tracking, zd = −(zG/Q + 2RT)
Grasp State feedback controller x˙d = 0, y˙d = 0, zd = −(zG/Q + 2RT)
Ascend State feedback controller x˙d = 0, y˙d = 0, zd = ztrnsprt
Transport State feedback controller rd = [xds, yds, ztrnsprt]T
Descend to drop State feedback controller rd = [xds, yds,−(zG/Q + 2RT)]T
Drop State feedback controller rd = [xds, yds,−(zG/Q + 2RT)]T
Return to search State feedback controller rd = [xds, yds, zsrch]T
Return to base State feedback controller rd = [x0, y0, zhvr]T
Reacquire target State feedback controller rd = rentry
Land State feedback controller rd = [x0, y0,−RQ]T
Emergency land Emergency contoller zd = −RQ
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5.1.2. Take-off
The UAV takes off to a position above the landing site rd = [x0, y0, zhvr]T , where zhvr is the hover height. This
ensures that the ground effect region is cleared before performing further manoeuvres. It then proceeds to Initialise
upon satisfying the condition ‖rQ − rd‖ < tol where tol is a tolerance value which varies from case to case.
5.1.3. Initialise
The UAV performs a self-diagnosis to identify any system faults. A system fault is detected with probability Ps,
in which case the UAV proceeds to Land. If no fault is detected, the UAV makes a transition to Search.
5.1.4. Search
The UAV follows a series of waypoints as defined by the Search pattern trajectory module. The spacing of the
waypoints and the search height zsrch are defined such that the camera’s field of view overlaps as it passes between
pairs of waypoints. The velocity command is limited to vmax = 2 m/s to ensure that the UAV does not pass over targets
too quickly. The Object tracking module is active during this mode, but does not inform the controller. It provides
only a boolean D ∈ {0, 1} which specifies whether a target has been detected. When D = 1, a transition to Identify is
triggered (see Figure 5).
As the UAV is aware of how many targets are present in the environment, it will return to base if all targets have
been located and retrieved. In such a situation, it does not therefore reach the final waypoint. If it reaches the final
waypoint, it is assumed that not all targets have been found. The UAV then proceeds to Return to base and triggers a
Mission failed flag. A time limit Tmax defined for the mission triggers a similar behaviour.
5.1.5. Identify
The transition to Identify is triggered when a target is detected by the Object tracking module, as described in
Section 5.3.5. The UAV typically has some lateral motion during this transition. The controller thus compensates for
overshooting the target by returning the UAV to the position recorded as it entered Identify, denoted rentry. Once it has
returned within a small radius of this position, that is ‖rQ − rentry‖ < tol, the UAV progresses to Hover above target.
5.1.6. Hover Above Target
As a result of the position command issued during Identify, the UAV is now in a position above the target which
makes the target visible to the camera sensor (see Figure 6). The Object tracking module detects blocks of colour
within a certain RGB range and determines the coordinates of their centroids. The coordinates of the centroid closest
to the centre of the image are supplied to the Visual controller. This has the result of moving the UAV directly above
the target. When the vehicle velocity in the xW-yW plane is near-zero, that is
√
x˙2Q + y˙
2
Q < tol, the UAV is above the
target and the UAV proceeds to Descend to grasp.
5.1.7. Descend to Grasp
The UAV uses the Object tracking and Visual controller modules to maintain its position directly above the target,
while descending to retrieve it. When the grasping mechanism position is within a small radius of the top of the target,
that is ‖rG − (rT − RT)‖ < tol, the UAV makes a transition to Grasp.
5.1.8. Grasp
The grasping mechanism is activated and the dynamics of the grasped target are tethered to those of the UAV, as
described by Equation (15). The UAV then proceeds to Ascend.
5.1.9. Ascend
The UAV ascends to the transport height ztrnsprt, while maintaining zero velocity in the horizontal plane. The UAV
proceeds to Transport upon reaching ztrnsprt, that is, satisfying |zQ − ztrnsprt| < tol. A grasping mechanism fault occurs
in this mode with probability Pg. When such a fault is detected, the UAV moves instead to Reacquire target.
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Figure 6: Mission visualisation, showing UAV, targets, UAV flight path and camera sensor image.
5.1.10. Transport
The UAV transports the tethered target to a position above the drop site, defined by rd = [xds, yds, ztrnsprt]T . The
UAV proceeds to Descend to drop upon the UAV reaching this position, that is ‖rQ − rd‖ < tol, for the mode-specific
command rd. A grasping mechanism fault occurs in this mode with probability Pg. Again, when such a fault is
detected, a transition to Reacquire target is triggered.
5.1.11. Descend to Drop
The UAV descends to a height where the target is touching the floor, that is zd = −(zG/Q + 2RT). If the target is
dropped early during this mode due to a grasping mechanism fault, the target is recorded as having been successfully
deposited and the UAV proceeds to Return to search. Otherwise, it progresses to Drop upon satisfying ‖rQ − rd‖ < tol,
where rd = [xds, yds, zd]T .
5.1.12. Drop
The grasping mechanism is deactivated and the dynamics of the target are untethered from the UAV and described
again by Equation (16). The UAV proceeds to Return to search if the mission is not complete (i.e. there are targets
still to be found) or to Return to base if all targets have been deposited at the drop site.
5.1.13. Return to Search
The UAV ascends vertically to search height above the drop site, that is, the position rd = [xds, yds, zsrch]T . It then
proceeds to Search upon satisfying ‖rQ − rd‖ < tol.
5.1.14. Return to Base
The UAV returns to a position rd = [x0, y0, zhvr]T above the landing site upon either successfully depositing all
targets, reaching the end of the search path or receiving a low battery warning. A transition to Land is triggered upon
satisfying ‖rQ − rd‖ < tol.
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5.1.15. Land
The UAV descends from its position above the landing site to rest on the landing site itself, at position rd =
[x0, y0,−RQ]T . The UAV then returns to Idle upon satisfying the conditions ‖rQ − rd‖ < tol1 and ‖r˙Q‖ < tol2. This
ensures that the motors are set to idle when the UAV is stationary at the landing site.
5.1.16. Reacquire Target
A transition to Reacquire target from Ascend or Transport is triggered upon a grasping mechanism fault occurring.
The transition occurs immediately upon the grasping mechanism failing. As the UAV may have a high velocity when
the transition occurs, it is commanded to return to the position rentry at which it entered the Reacquire target mode in
order to maximise the probability of visually reacquiring the target. To exit this mode, the conditions ‖rQ−rentry‖ < tol1,
‖r˙Q‖ < tol2 must be satisfied. The guidance mode changes to Hover above target if the Object tracking module detects
a target, that is, the module has set D = 1, or to Search if the previous conditions are satisfied and no target is detected,
that is, D = 0. That is, the target has been lost and the highest probability of reacquiring it occurs while following the
search waypoints.
5.1.17. Emergency Land
A transition to Emergency land may occur in any mode bar Emergency land itself and Idle. The Emergency
controller is employed, accepting only the height command zd = −RQ. The UAV returns to Idle upon the condition
|zQ + RQ| < tol being satisfied.
5.2. Additional Transitions
As highlighted by Figure 5, the modes Reacquire target and Emergency land may be reached from a large number
of other modes. These transitions are triggered by the detection of faults. The autonomous controller reacts to the
occurrence of faults by switching to a mode which is designed to handle the effects of the fault.
5.2.1. Low Battery Warning
A simple battery monitor subsystem checks the battery voltage V and triggers a transition to Return to base when
V ≤ Vth, where Vth is the lower threshold. This transition can occur in any mode except those in the path leading from
Return to base to Idle, that is Return to base, Land, Emergency land or Idle. Following this transition, any tethered
targets are released, as the mission priority is to recharge the battery.
5.2.2. Actuator Fault
An actuator fault occurs with probability Pa. This triggers a transition to Emergency land. It may occur in any
mode except Emergency land or Idle.
5.3. Control and Trajectory Modules
The control and trajectory modules active at any given time are determined by the UAV’s mode, as previously
described. The modules work in combination to follow the commands issued in the active mode. As an example,
during Take-off, the desired vehicle behaviour is to hover at a static position above the landing site. A constant
position command is therefore supplied to the State feedback controller. In Search, the UAV is required to follow
one waypoint after another. It therefore requires a Search pattern module to define the changing position commands
and the State feedback controller to track them. A State reconstruction module is active at all times. This module is
required to reconstruct the dynamic states of the quadrotor from the available sensor measurements.
The vehicle control laws determine the pseudo-inputs of the UAV, uˆ = [ucol, uroll, upitch, uyaw]T , detailed in [28, 29,
23]. We may define these four pseudo-inputs in terms of the true rotor inputs u = [u1, u2, u3, u4]T such that
uˆ = Cu, where C =

1 1 1 1
0 0 1 −1
−1 1 0 0
−1 −1 0 0
 (18)
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If the controller determines the pseudo-inputs, then the true rotor inputs are found from the inverse relationship
u = C−1uˆ.
This section describes the control and trajectory modules which work in combination to supply these pseudo-inputs
and therefore drive the UAV behaviour. The module combinations and mode-dependent commands are specified in
Table 1.
5.3.1. State Reconstruction
The control and navigation systems of the UAV require knowledge of the system states xQ. These are not directly
obtainable and must be measured through the sensors. The states may then be reconstructed in software from the
sensor outputs. The sensor model omits errors in the measurement relationships. It is therefore assumed that the
position rQ and attitude ηQ are perfectly reconstructed from the Optitrack measurements, while the angular rates ωQ
are similarly reconstructed without error from the gyroscope outputs. Translational velocity is obtained by filtering
and differentiating the vehicle position
vˆQ =
Ns
s + N
rQ (19)
where N is the filter bandwidth.
5.3.2. State Feedback Controller
A state feedback controller with feedback linearisation [28, 23, 30] stabilises the quadrotor and ensures accurate
tracking of position and yaw commands. The position controller consists of cascaded state feedbacks, with the desired
acceleration given by
r¨d = Kdr (r˙d − r˙) (20)
and the desired velocity given by
r˙d = Kpr
(
rd − rQ) (21)
where rd is the desired position and r˙d is subject to the limit ‖r˙d‖ ≤ vmax, where vmax is an artificial maximum velocity
limit. Decoupling of the position and velocity feedbacks is required for the visual controller described by Equation
(29). Linearising feedbacks then use the desired acceleration command r¨d to determine the collective pseudo-input
ucol =
mQ(g − z¨d)
KT cos φ cos θ
(22)
and the roll and pitch commands
φd = arcsin
(
mQ (y¨d cosψ − x¨d sinψ)
KT ucol
)
θd = − arcsin
(
mQ (x¨d cosψ + y¨d sinψ)
KT ucol cos φ
) (23)
where the commands are subject to the limits {|φd |, |θd |} ≤ amax, where amax is an artificial maximum roll/pitch limit.
The attitude controller is similarly defined by the state feedback
ω˙d = Kpη
(
ηd − ηQ
)
−KdηωQ (24)
and the linearising feedbacks  urollupitchuyaw
 =

Ix
KT L
0 0
0 IyKT L 0
0 0 IzKQ
 ω˙d (25)
where Kpη = [Kpφ,Kpθ,Kpψ] and Kdη = [Kdφ,Kdθ,Kdψ].
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Table 2: Waypoints for UAV search mode.
Waypoint xd yd zd ψd
1 −1.5 −3.0 −2 pi2
2 −1.5 3.0 −2 pi2
3 −1.0 3.0 −2 − pi2
4 −1.0 −3.0 −2 − pi2
5 −0.5 −3.0 −2 pi2
6 −0.5 3.0 −2 pi2
7 0.0 3.0 −2 − pi2
8 0.0 −3.0 −2 − pi2
9 0.5 −3.0 −2 pi2
10 0.5 3.0 −2 pi2
11 1.0 3.0 −2 − pi2
12 1.0 −3.0 −2 − pi2
13 1.5 −3.0 −2 pi2
14 1.5 3.0 −2 pi2
5.3.3. Search Pattern
The search pattern module defines a series of nw waypoints which the UAV follows after taking off. The waypoint
locations are defined such that following each one from the beginning to the end of the search pattern results in near-
exhaustive visual coverage of the environment floor. As each waypoint is reached, the counter cwp ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nw}
is incremented. Then, if the UAV exits Search to investigate a target or return to base, it is able to return to the last
waypoint reached. This ensures comprehensive coverage of the environment. The waypoints are listed in Table 2.
5.3.4. Emergency Controller
The emergency controller is similar to the state feedback controller in structure. It is utilised only when an actuator
fault occurs and an emergency landing is required. In this event, it is assumed that a single rotor has malfunctioned
and it is known which rotor this is. The controller then disables the opposing rotor and increases the thrust to the
remaining two rotors to reduce the chance of a hard landing.
With one rotor inoperable, attitude control is neglected to avoid increasing the possibility of a crash. The collective
pseudo-input relationship is still given by Equation (22). The remaining pseudo-inputs are fixed at zero. With two
rotors inactive, the remaining two rotors must each bear half of the required thrust, giving
uQ =
[0.5, 0.5, 0, 0]T ucol if rotor 3 or 4 is faulty[0, 0, 0.5, 0.5]T ucol if rotor 1 or 2 is faulty (26)
5.3.5. Object Tracking
The object tracking module is used to identify targets within the camera’s field of view. The centroid of an identified
object in the camera image provides coordinates which are utilised by the visual controller. Thus, upon identifying a
target, the UAV is able to accurately position itself above the target and descend to collect it.
The object recognition subsystem emulates that of a simple colour detection algorithm. The targets have distinctive
colours which allow them to stand out from each other and the environment. The subsystem masks certain colour
ranges in the camera image, thus allowing detection of the targets when they enter the camera field of view. This
is emulated in simulation by considering which vertices of the global geometry are within the camera field of view,
then identifying the faces and colours associated with these vertices. The actual process of colour detection and the
simulated process are described in this section.
Colour Detection Approach. A colour image of resolution p × q is typically described by a p × q × 3 array. Different
colour models may be used. In this instance, the popular RGB (red-green-blue) model is employed. Each of the three
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(a) Captured image. (b) Image mask. (c) Mask applied to image, with centroid
indicated.
Figure 7: Mask applied to image and centroid indicated.
p× q slices of the array then describes the intensity of the image in red, green and blue. Intensity values typically vary
between 0 and 255. Colour detection is achieved by considering ranges of values for each of the three colours.
Consider the image of a simple monochromatic object, shown in Figure 7a. A mask is generated, which shows
only the colours within a certain range, as shown in Figure 7b. The centroid of the unmasked region then provides the
approximate geometrical centre of the object, as shown in Figure 7c.
The target objects are defined using distinctive colours which are unique in the environment. The coordinates of
the centroid then provide the feedback for the visual controller. This allows the UAV to position itself according to the
imagery received by the camera, as interpreted by the colour detection algorithm.
Object Detection Model. The geometry of the model is described in Section 4.3 and the transformation of vertices
into camera space described in Section 4.6.3. To be detected, at least one vertex of a single object must satisfy the
conditions for visibility to the camera sensor.
Consider the case where mvis vertices are visible to the camera, with coordinates ci, i ∈ Nmvis ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, m
being the total number of vertices in the geometrical model of the scenario. That is, each set of coordinates ci satisfies
the conditions imposed by Equation (14). Each set of coordinates corresponds to a vertex vi. Each vertex is then
associated with one or more faces f j ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Thus, each vertex is also associated with one more colours
C j ∈ [0, 1], where the RGB range [0, 255] is normalised in the range [0, 1].
Colour detection is achieved by considering only vertices with an associated colour inside a range. For example,
to detect red objects, the colour arrays C j associated with all visible coordinates ci are considered in the limits Clw =
[0.4, 0, 0]T , Cup = [1, 0, 0]T . In the simplified geometry we employ in our model, this ignores all colours except the
solid red which represents the spherical target. We then consider the b coordinates ci, i ∈ Rb for which the associated
colours satisfy the condition Clw ≤ C j ≤ Cup.
Hence, any colour of interest is detected and its vertices identified. We then use a simple centroid calculation to
obtain the approximate centre of the target in the camera image
ccntrd =
1
b
b∑
i=1
ci (27)
The detection of a target is specified by the boolean D ∈ {0, 1}. To avoid detecting targets at the extremes of the
image and then losing them due to the UAV motion, a target is only considered as having been identified when its
centroid is within a certain radius of the image centre. This boundary is clearly visible in Figure 6. Thus D = 1 if
‖ccntrd‖ < Rc, where Rc is the radius around the image centre.
Targets already in the drop zone are also ignored. This is accomplished by identifying the drop site position in
the camera image cds and rejecting centroids outside the radius Rds,C. Hence D = 0 if ‖cds‖ < Rds,C, where Rds,C
approximates the drop zone radius by
Rds,C = f
Rds
|zC|
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The object detection algorithm checks for all three primary colours simultaneously. Where multiple centroids are
defined, that is, multiple colours are visible to the camera, the centroid closest to the image centre is supplied to the
visual controller. This centroid ccntrd is supplied to the visual controller.
5.3.6. Visual Controller
The coordinates of the centroid are denoted ccntrd = [cx, cy]. The position controller acts to drive the coordinates
towards the centre of the camera image. To achieve consistency with the state feedback controller, the error is defined
as a function of the coordinates and the camera height above the ground, that is
e =
∣∣∣∣∣ zQ − zC/Qf
∣∣∣∣∣ [cycx
]
(28)
where zC/Q is the component of the camera position in Q and the centroid coordinates are swapped for consistency
with the reference frame Q.
A proportional-integral (PI) controller then centres the coordinates in the camera image and the target directly
below the UAV. The controller provides a desired velocity command which is simply supplied to the state feedback
controller in lieu of the existing horizontal position controller and is given by[
x˙d
y˙d
]
=
[
cosψ − sinψ
sinψ cosψ
] (
Kpve + Kiv
∫
e dt
)
(29)
where Kpv, Kiv are the proportional and integral gains, respectively.
These commands override the horizontal velocity commands of the state feedback controller in Equation (20). The
height of the UAV continues to be controlled by the position controller (Equation (21)) in this mode.
6. Results
The model is used in a Monte Carlo experiment. The stochastic nature of the model has the effect of changing
the timing and outcome of events and the ultimate success or failure of the mission. In this section, we first present
and discuss the results of a single simulation run. The results of a Monte Carlo simulation conducted over 2,000
runs are then considered. The agent models employ the properties described in Table 3. The UAV’s guidance has the
parameters described in Table 4.
6.1. Single Run
The simulation is run with landing site, drop site and target positions defined at random and the potential for faults
determined by the corresponding probability distribution. In this instance, the mission is successful and takes 170 s to
complete.
We can see in Figure 8 the flight path followed by the UAV during the mission. It takes off and flies to the first
waypoint at [−1.5,−3] before following a path to the second waypoint at [−1.5, 3]. The red spherical target and blue
pyramidal target are within both the camera field of view and the object detection algorithm’s radius of interest while
following this path. The UAV thus diverts to retrieve these targets. While the blue target is identified first, the forward
motion of the vehicle results in the red target having closer proximity to the UAV as it enters Hover above target mode.
The red target is thus retrieved and deposited first.
The UAV then returns to the first waypoint and again follows the path to the second. This ensures that any
additional targets along this path are detected. The blue target is again identified. It is retrieved and deposited at the
drop site. The UAV again returns to the first waypoint and follows the path to the second waypoint. Finding no further
targets, it proceeds to the third, fourth then fifth waypoints. While following the path to the sixth waypoint, it detects
the green cuboidal target. It retrieves and deposits this target at the drop site. Having successfully deposited all three
targets, the UAV returns to the landing site and the mission ends.
We can obtain further information on the mission by analysing the height history of the UAV, shown in Figure 9.
The UAV clearly begins the mission by taking off to a height of one metre. It then immediately lands again, indicating
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Table 3: Quadrotor, target and environment properties.
Property Symbol Value Unit
Camera aspect ratio A 4/3 –
Quadrotor/floor damping coefficient cQ 75.5 N s m−1
Target/floor damping coefficient cT 20 N s m−1
Camera focal length f 400 –
Acceleration due to gravity g 9.81 m s−2
Quadrotor moment of inertia about xQ Ix 0.03 kg m2
Quadrotor moment of inertia about yQ Iy 0.03 kg m2
Quadrotor moment of inertia about zQ Iz 0.04 kg m2
Rotor torque gain KQ 120 N
Rotor thrust gain KT 0.2 N m
Quadrotor/floor spring coefficient kQ 3775 N m−1
Target/floor spring coefficient kT 1000 N m−1
Rotor moment arm L 0.2 m
Quadrotor mass mQ 1.51 kg
Target mass mT 0.4 kg
Probability of actuator fault in period Ta Pa 0.01 –
Probability of grasper fault in period Tg Pg 0.05 –
Probability of system fault during Initialise Ps 0.05 –
Drop zone radius Rds 0.25 m
Quadrotor effective radius RQ 0.2 m
Target effective radius RT 0.05 m
Camera position in Q rC/Q [0, 0, 0.1]T m
Grasper position in Q rG/Q [0, 0, 0.2]T m
Time period for actuator fault probability Pa Ta 60 s
Time period for actuator fault probability Pg Tg 60 s
Maximum battery voltage Vmax 11 V
Battery charging rate vc 0.025 V s−1
Battery discharging rate vd -0.005 V s−1
Time constant of gimbal response τg 0.005 s
Camera field of view λ 45 ◦
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Table 4: Guidance system and controller properties.
Property Symbol Value Unit
Maximum roll/pitch command amax 20 ◦
Velocity controller gain Kdr 3.9 –
Roll/pitch rate controller gain Kdφ,Kdθ 39 –
Yaw rate controller gain Kdψ 1.95 –
Visual controller integral gain Kiv 0.0001 –
Position controller gain Kpr 0.975 –
Visual controller proportional gain Kpv 0.341 –
Roll/pitch angle controller gain Kpφ,Kpθ 380.25 –
Yaw angle controller gain Kpψ 0.951 –
Velocity filter bandwidth N 50 rad s−1
Maximum velocity command vmax 5 m s−1
Hover height zhvr -1 m
Search height zsrch -2 m
Transport height ztrnsprt -1 m
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Figure 8: UAV flight path and target position during example mission.
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Figure 9: Height history during the mission. The dashed line indicates the height command.
that a system fault has occurred, that is (1− Ps) > X ∼ U(0, 1). The UAV then takes off again, before ascending to the
search height of two metres and continuing the mission.
We can see that the UAV descends multiple times during the mission to an altitude of around 0.3 m. This is
the height at which it grasps and drops the targets. It thus occurs six times, grasping and dropping each target. An
additional descent occurs at around 100 s. This is followed by a period of around 20 s where the UAV rests on the floor.
This is clearly an instance of a low battery warning triggering a return to base, where the UAV sits idle until it has
recharged. It then resumes the mission. We may confirm this assumption by checking the battery voltage level history
in Figure 10. The voltage level clearly crosses the threshold just prior to the 100 s mark. The UAV then returns to
base and recharges the battery until full, before resuming the mission. The mission is then completed before a second
recharge is required.
6.2. Monte Carlo Simulation
We may approximate the probability of the mission being successful using Monte Carlo simulation. This provides
a result which may be compared to the results of the model checking approach in future work. We may also analyse
the paths taken by the finite state machine as the UAV performs the mission.
For the Monte Carlo simulation, we employ a simplified version of the simulation. The quadrotor initial position
is fixed at rQ,0 = [−1.8795,−2.5936,−0.2000]T m with heading ψQ,0 = 0.9305 rad. The drop site location is similarly
fixed at rds = [1.3303,−1.3307, 0]T m. The number of targets has been reduced to two. The initial positions of
the targets are still randomly defined as previously described. The faults which may occur are still subject to the
probabilities previously described. These simplifications are employed to facilitate comparison with the results of
model checking the scenario in PRISM, which is currently in an earlier state of development.
The simulation is run for 2,000 iterations. The stochastic and probabilistic properties of the model are shown to
impact a number of general mission properties. These properties include: the outcome of the mission; the duration of
the mission; the times spent and distance travelled in each mode and; the transitions from one mode to another.
6.2.1. Analyses of Mission Failures
The probability of mission success is given in Table 5 as almost 80%. We may examine missions for which the
outcome was failure in order to obtain a number of reasons for these failures. First, at least one target may already be
in the drop zone as the mission begins. Since the UAV ignores objects in the radius around the drop site, it is unable
to find this target and reaches the end of the search path having relocated the remaining targets. Since all targets must
be retrieved for the mission to be considered successful, this instance results in a mission failure.
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Figure 10: Battery voltage level during the mission. The upper and lower dashed lines indicate the maximum voltage
level and warning threshold, respectively.
Table 5: Results of Monte Carlo method.
Parameter Occurrence
Mission success 0.8750
System fault in Initialise mode 0.0484
Actuator fault during mission 0.0335
Grasping fault during target transportation 0.0105
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A similar outcome occurs when a target lands in the drop zone but does not register as having been deposited. This
occurs when the target is dropped during Transport and lands in the drop zone, rendering it invisible to the UAV. The
premature release of the target can occur due to a grabber fault or a low battery warning.
Yet another route to mission failure is identified in the random positioning of the targets. One or more targets may
be located such that they are ignored by the UAV, despite being outside of the drop zone. This may occur when targets
are located in the corners of the environment. The target is outside of the object tracking algorithm’s radius of interest
Rc and, without any overlapping fly-bys occurring in this area, the target is ignored.
The remainder of mission failures occur due to actuator faults, which may occur at any time. Since returning to
the landing site is a prerequisite for mission success, an emergency landing results in mission failure. This occurs
regardless of whether all three targets have been retrieved and deposited at the drop site.
6.2.2. Probabilities Derived from Simulation
The probabilities of each of the three faults occurring are also given in Table 5. A system fault may occur during
Initialise only. The probability of this occurring was given the explicit value Ps = 0.05. We use this probability
as a verification check, with the result that the measured occurrence of a system fault in Initialise is Ps,m = 0.0484.
The result is found from over 4,000 samples, thus we can state with some confidence that a system fault occurs with
expected frequency.
The actuator fault is specified as having a certain probability Pa = 0.01 of occurring with a given time Ta = 60 s.
The results of the Monte Carlo experiment provide the occurrence of an actuator fault as percentage of the total number
of iterations. As the actuator fault results in the mission ending in failure, it may only occur once per mission. An
actuator fault is found to occur in 3.35% of missions.
The grasping mechanism fault is similarly defined as having a probability Pg = 0.05 of occurring in a Tg = 60 s
period. This fault can occur at any time during the mission. However, it only has impact when the mechanism is active,
that is, when a target is tethered to the UAV. The occurrence of a grasping fault is thus limited to those modes during
which a target is tethered to the UAV. A grasping mechanism fault is then found to cause a premature target drop in
1.05% of the missions.
Mission time is found to have an average of 137.2 s.
We may also consider the probabilities of progressing from one mode to another. The finite state machine in
Figure 5 may be redrawn as Figure 11, where the predicates for the transitions are replaced with the probabilities of a
given transition occurring. Multiple modes may lead to both Emergency land and Return to base. The probabilities of
these transitions occurring are listed separately in Table 6 for clarity.
In the majority of cases, it is clear that there is a favoured mode to progress to from a given initial mode. Consider
the transition from Initialise to Search, which has a much higher probability of occurring that a transition from Initialise
to Land. In contrast, while Hover above target is most likely to progress to Descend to grasp, the probability of the
UAV instead proceeding to Search is non-negligible.
As expected, the probability of progressing from Drop to Return to base versus Return to search is near equal.
Since there are only two targets, the UAV will either Return to search after dropping the first target or Return to base
after dropping the final target.
7. Symbolic Abstract Model
As discussed in the introduction, the simulation model developed in this paper is intended to aid in the devel-
opment of a framework for analysing autonomous systems and, in particular, the synthesis of high-level control for
such systems. As an initial investigation, we are using the simulation model in the development and validation of a
symbolic abstract model of the same scenario [31]. In the symbolic model the quantitative data for abstract modes
and actions is derived from simulating small-scale models which, in turn, are derived from the presented simulation
model. When building the abstraction non-determinism is introduced as the precise behaviour of the system is lost.
The symbolic model is therefore represented as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) which exhibits both probabilistic
and non-deterministic choice [32].
An MDP consists of a set of states, set of actions, probabilistic transition function and reward function. In any
state of an MDP there is a set of available actions (a subset of the action set) and for any state and available action the
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Figure 11: Finite-state machine showing probabilities of transitioning from one state to another.
Table 6: Probabilities of transitioning from a given state/mode to Emergency land or Return to base.
Mode Emergency land Return to base
Idle 0 0
Take-off 0 0
Initialise 0 0
Search 0.0036 0.1460
Identify 0 0
Hover above target 0.0025 0.0539
Descend to grasp 0.0034 0.0156
Grasp 0 0.0002
Ascend 0.0017 0.0224
Transport 0.0010 0.0356
Descend to drop 0 0.0176
Drop 0 0.4698
Return to search 0 0.0051
Return to base 0.0003 –
Land 0.0012 –
Reacquire target 0 –
Emergency land – –
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probabilistic transition function returns a distribution over successor states and the reward function returns the reward
accumulated when taking the action. The behaviour in any state consists of a non-deterministic choice from the set
of available actions, followed by a probabilistic choice made according to the probabilistic transition function. An
execution of an MDP is an sequence of such choices. The non-deterministic choices of available actions in each state
are resolved by a strategy (also called an adversary or scheduler) which can base its choices on the execution up to
that point. For a given strategy, the behaviour of an MDP is captured by a probability measure over the executions
corresponding to the strategy’s choices.
Key properties for MDPs are the probability of reaching a target set of states and the expected reward cumulated
until this occurs. Of particular interest are the minimum and maximum values for these properties over all strategies.
In models where the non-determinism in the MDP is through the abstraction of a concrete value, the minimum and
maximum values yield upper and lower bounds on the precise value for the concrete system [33].
7.1. Model Checking with PRISM
We have built and analysed the symbolic model using the probabilistic model checker PRISM [3, 34]. Models
in PRISM are expressed using a high level modelling language based on the Reactive Modules formalism [35]. A
model consists of a number of interacting modules. Each module consists of a number of finite-valued variables
corresponding to the module’s state and the transitions of a module are defined by a number of guarded commands of
the form:
[<action>] <guard> → <prob> : <update> + · · · + <prob> : <update>
A command consists of an (optional) action label, a guard and probabilistic choice between updates. A guard is a
predicate over the variables of the modules, while an update specifies, using primed variables, how the variables of the
module are updated when the command is taken. Interaction between modules is through both the guards (as guards
can refer to variables of other modules) and action labels which allow modules to synchronise. Support for reward
functions are through reward items of the form:
[<action>] <guard> : <reward>;
representing the reward accumulated when taken taking an action in a state satisfying guard. A reward is a real-valued
expression which can include variables and constants of the model.
Our PRISM specification consists of four modules: a UAV module, Time/Battery/Actuator module, Movement
module and Object module. The complete PRISM code can be found in the repository [36]. To illustrate the abstract
PRISM model, we present some fragments of the PRISM code corresponding to abstract actions representing search,
grasp and release. In these code fragments the following variables appear:
• s1 representing the current mode of the UAV;
• posx and posy representing the coordinates of UAV (the height of the UAV is abstracted);
• retx and rety representing the position of the last way point;
• c representing the status of the actuator (operational or failed);
• b representing the battery charge level;
• t representing the current mission time;
• NoOfObjs representing the number of objects still to be found.
Fragments of the PRISM code for the abstract action search are presented in Figure 12. In the UAV module, the UAV
stays in the search mode if it has not found an object and has not reached the last possible coordinates (of the arena).
If an object has been found, there is a transition to the identify mode.
In the Time/Battery/Actuator module, in accordance with the simulation model and small scale simulation results,
the UAV moves one grid square per second, the rate of depletion of the battery is one unit per second and the probability
of the actuator failing in one second is 0.00018. If the actuator does not fail (c=0), the battery level and time are
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// formula to check if search has found either object 1 or 2
formula FOUND = ((posx=Objx1 & posy=Objy1) | (posx=Objx2 & posy=Objy2));
// UAV Module - search mode (s1=3)
// found object (record way point for returning to search) and move to identify mode
[srch] s1=3 & FOUND → (s1′=4)&(retx′=posx)&(rety′=posy);
// not found object and not finished search (continue in search mode)
[srch] s1=3 & !(posx=lastX & posy=lastY) & !FOUND → true;
// not found object and finished search (move to return to base mode)
[srch] s1=3 & posx=lastX & posy=lastY & !FOUND → (s1′=12)&(retx′=posx)&(rety′=posy);
// Time/Battery/Actuator Module - search
// Actuator fault occurs in one time step with probability pf
// if operational update time and charge, otherwise update actuator
// continue search - action can be done within time limit and battery is sufficiently charged
[srch] c=0 & b>Blow & t+dt<Miss → pow(1−pf , dt) : (t′=t+dt)&(b′=b−db∗dt) + (1−pow(1−pf , dt)) : (c′=1);
// Movement Module - search
// moving along the x-axis to the right
[srch] posx≥0 & posx<Xcoord & posy≤Ycoord & mod(posy, 2)=0 & !FOUND → (posx′=posx+1);
// moving along the y-axis (reached the right boundary of the arena)
[srch] posx=Xcoord & mod(posy, 2)=0 & posy<Ycoord & !FOUND → (posy′=posy+1);
// moving along the x-axis to the left
[srch] posx>0 & posx≤Xcoord & posy≤Ycoord & mod(posy, 2)=1 & !FOUND → (posx′=posx−1);
// moving along the y-axis (reached left boundary of the arena)
[srch] posx=0 & mod(posy, 2)=1 & posy<Ycoord & !FOUND → (posy′=posy+1);
// found an object
[srch] FOUND → true;
// reached the last search coordinates
[srch] posx=lastX & posy=lastY → true;
Figure 12: PRISM code relating to the abstract action search.
// Time constants
const int Tgl = 0; // time to grab/release lower bound
const int Tgu = 1; // time to grab/release upper bound
// UAV Module - grasp mode (s1=6), drop mode (s1=10)
// grab object and start ascending moving to base
[grab] (s1=6) → (s1′=7);
// drop object and start ascending (towards search or base)
[rel] (s1=10) → (s1′=11);
// Time/Battery/Actuator Module
// Actuator fault occurs in one time step with pf probability
// if operational update time and charge, otherwise update actuator
// grab - upper time bound - action can be done within time limit and battery is sufficiently charged
[grab] c=0 & b>Blow & t+Tgu<Miss → pow(1−pf ,Tgu) : (t′=t+Tgu)&(b′=b−db∗Tgu) + (1−pow(1−pf ,Tgu)) : (c′=1);
// grab - lower time bound - action can be done within time limit and battery is sufficiently charged
[grab] c=0 & b>Blow & (t+Tgl<Miss) → pow(1−pf ,Tgl) : (t′=t+Tgl)&(b′=b−db∗Tgl) + (1−pow(1−pf ,Tgl)) : (c′=1);
// release - upper time bound - action can be done within the time limit and battery is sufficiently charged
[rel] c=0 & b>Blow & t+Tgu<Miss → pow(1−pf ,Tgu) : (t′=t+Tgu)&(b′=b−db∗Tgu) + (1−pow(1−pf ,Tgu)) : (c′=1);
// release - lower time bound - action can be done within the time limit and battery is sufficiently charged
[rel] c=0 & b>Blow & t+Tgl<Miss → pow(1−pf ,Tgl) : (t′=t+Tgl)&(b′=b−db∗Tgl) + (1−pow(1−pf ,Tgl)) : (c′=1);
// Object Module
// grab object from where it was found
[grab] s1!=10 → true;
// release - object has been deposited safely, one less object to search for
[rel] s1=10 & NoOfObjs>0 → (NoOfObjs′=NoOfObjs−1);
Figure 13: PRISM code fragments relating to the grasp and release abstract actions.
updated. In the abstract model when a transition corresponds to more than one second elapsing we have to ensure
we have the correct values for the battery depletion and the cumulative probability of failure. More precisely, if a
transition in the abstract model takes t seconds, then when taking this transition the battery gets depleted by t units and
the probability that the actuator does not fail is (1−pf )t (and hence the probability of failure is 1−(1−pf )t).
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// lower and upper bounds for the probability of a successfully mission
Pmin=? [ F “MissionSuccessful” ];
Pmax=? [ F “MissionSuccessful” ];
// lower and upper bounds for an actuator fault occuring
Pmin=? [ F “fault” ];
Pmax=? [ F “fault” ];
// lower and upper bounds for the expected mission time
R{“time”}min=? [ F “done” ];
R{“time”}max=? [ F “done” ];
Figure 14: PRISM properties code.
The fragments of the PRISM code for the three modules relevant to grab and release actions are presented in
Figure 13. The grasp and release abstract actions were both shown to take 0.01 seconds via small-scale simulation.
Through non-determinism (see Figure 13), the PRISM model abstracts these timing values to lower and upper bounds
(0 and 1). In the Object module the number of non-deposited objects NoOfObjs is decremented when an object is
released at the depot site.
We evaluated the symbolic implementation by building a model for each combination of object positioning in
the arena, while keeping the base and the depot sites fixed. The properties that we focused on determine probability
bounds for a mission to be successful, and for a mission to end due to an actuator fault respectively. The PRISM
properties are shown in Figure 14 and we have computed minimum and maximum values yielding upper and lower
bounds for the concrete system. The bounds obtained are:
• [0.661, 0.891] for the probability of successful mission completion (the simulation results returned 0.8750);
• [0.018, 0.041] for the probability of an actuator fault (the simulation results returned 0.0335);
• [101.3, 223.7] for the expected mission time (the simulation results returned 137.2).
As can be seen the bounds from the symbolic model encompass the outcomes from the Monte Carlo simulations
presented in Section 6. We can also see that the relative differences of the bounds are of the same order of magnitude.
Although the bounds are not tight, they are promising for an initial investigation. One potential reason for the bounds
not being tight is how time has been abstracted in the model. In particular, in some cases the lower bound on the time
taken for some transitions is 0 (as can be seen in Figure 13), allowing certain abstract actions to be taken repeatedly
without influencing the overall mission time. This behaviour is clearly not realisable in the simulation model.
8. Conclusions
We may draw some conclusions on the verification of real-world autonomous systems from both the development
of our continuous-time model and the results of the simulation.
8.1. Limitations of the Model
As an entity in simulation only, our model simplifies or omits some complex real-world behaviours. First, target
impact on UAV behaviour is not modelled. In reality, grasping the target would alter the mass and moments of inertia
of the UAV. This would then affect the closed-loop response of the vehicle, potentially changing the outcome of the
mission. Specifically, the impact of the target mass on the state feedback controller must be considered in any practical
implementation of the scenario.
Additionally, no fault detection algorithm is implemented. Faults in the system are assumed to be detected in-
stantaneously. The autonomous controller then switches to an appropriate mode to mitigate the effects of the fault.
In reality, the faults would be detected either be sensors monitoring the affected components or by any simple fault
detection method [37].
The lack of disturbances and the use of feedback linearisation in the controller precludes the need for integral
action. This is because the linearising feedbacks perfectly cancel out the non-linearities and system properties in
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simulation [29]. In reality, this feedbacks do not perfectly cancel out the system dynamics. Thus, there is a need for a
more robust controller. The presence of disturbances in reality further establishes the need for integral action.
While a simple power model is implemented in our quadrotor agent, its role is simply as an additional predicate
for a greater variety of transitions in the finite state machine. In reality, a decreasing battery voltage may impact the
performance of the rotors and can affect the flight characteristics of the UAV even before a return to base command is
issued.
The camera sensor and grasping mechanism are optimally positioned such that an object centred in the camera
image is directly below the grasping mechanism. In reality, the grasper would obscure the object from view. In
implementing the autonomous quadrotor system, we would need to carefully consider the positions of the camera and
grasper and their impact on the target detection and grasping.
Finally, we have simplified the interaction and operation of the UAV’s subsystems by assuming they function
flawlessly. For example, the camera sensor is assumed to have a high framerate and perceives the targets as solid
blocks of colour. The object detection module is assumed to execute at a high bandwidth, resulting in no lag between
the camera and the eventual centroid coordinates. In reality, the object detection will likely be imperfect and will run
at a relatively low bandwidth to ensure real-time execution. This would then impact both the visual controller and the
autonomous mode switching.
8.2. Limitations of the Autonomous Controller
The modes of the autonomous controller FSM were primarily determined prior to implementation. Early simu-
lation testing resulted in the occurrence of events for which the FSM had not been programmed to consider. Some
additional modes were thus incorporated into the FSM, such as Reacquire target or Return to search. Experimental
testing in the future is likely to highlight further gaps in the FSM and require the addition of more guidance modes.
The current implementation of the autonomous controller is deliberately lacking in parts, to better facilitate the
chance of mission failures. Analysis of the mission specifics for each of the 2,000 iterations provides a number of
reasons for mission failure.
First, there is the possibility that the UAV believes the mission has failed when it has in fact been successful. This
may occur when the location of one of the targets is randomly defined to be already in the specified radius around the
drop site. The UAV is unable to detect this target. It therefore follows the mission in depositing the remaining targets,
before reaching the end of the search path and returning to base, believing the mission has failed. This outcome is a
consequence of the fact that both target location and drop site are defined randomly and may therefore coincide. The
autonomous behaviour of the UAV does not conceive of this occurrence, knowing only that there are three targets and
that it has deposited two.
A similar outcome can occur when all targets are initially outside of the drop site radius, but at least one is somehow
undetectable to the UAV. This only occurs when the target is positioned in the corner of the environment, as the overlap
in sensor perception elsewhere prevents this occurrence otherwise.
8.3. Future Work
We aim to continue this work on two fronts. First, we are continuing our work in formal verification of autonomous
systems in PRISM. The symbolic model of our system must satisfy the dual requirements of accurately describing the
intricacies of the system, while also being sufficiently simple that it may be verified in a short period of time. The
pursuit of this research is intended to lead to the creation of a framework for the verification of autonomous systems.
For that we need to formally prove a connection between the simulation and symbolic models which will allow us
to infer results for the actual system from those obtained through model checking the symbolic model. The longer
term goal is to develop a highly adaptable framework for analysing autonomous systems. For example, once the
initial small-scale simulation models for abstract actions and symbolic models have been set up for a certain scenario,
different decision algorithms can be easily substituted and analysed. In addition, we can reuse the quantitative data
for abstract actions obtained from the small scale simulation models when analysing different scenarios in which the
same abstract actions occur.
On the second front, we are implementing our autonomous mission in controlled laboratory conditions. By doing
this, we hope to identify additional factors which affect the mission outcome and determine whether these factors
may be mitigated by robust system design or by real-time system verification. We are also investigating the required
hardware to support real-time verification and onboard autonomy.
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